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We consider an extension of strategic normal form games with a phase before the ac-
tual play of the game, where players can make binding offers for transfer of utilities to
other players after the play of the game, contingent on the recipient playing the strategy
indicated in the offer. Such offers transform the payoff matrix of the original game but
preserve its non-cooperative nature. The type of offers we focus on here are conditional
on a suggested matching offer of the same kind made in return by the receiver. Play-
ers can exchange a series of such offers, thus engaging in a bargaining process before
a strategic normal form game is played. In this paper we study and analyse solution
concepts for two-player normal form games with such preplay negotiation phase, under
several assumptions for the bargaining power of the players, as well as the value of time
for the players in such negotiations. We obtain results describing the possible solutions
of such bargaining games and analyse the degrees of efficiency and fairness that can be
achieved in such negotiation process. We show the similarities and the differences with
a variety of frameworks in the literature of bargaining games and games with a preplay
phase.
Keywords: Non-cooperative games; preplay negotiations; bargaining; fairness and effi-
ciency
1. Introduction
It is well known that some normal form games have no pure strategy Nash equi-
libria, while others, like the Prisoner’s Dilemma, have rather unsatisfactory – e.g.,
strongly Pareto dominated – ones. These inefficiencies are often attributed to lack
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of possibility for the players to communicate and reach agreement on a mutually
beneficial joint course of action, before the actual play of the game. Indeed, undesir-
able outcomes could often be avoided if players were able to communicate and make
binding agreements on the joint strategy to play before the game starts. However,
even if players could freely communicate before the game, the enforcing of such
coalitional contracts is often not possible in practice and, furthermore, it would
change the nature of the game from non-cooperative to essentially cooperative.
Here we consider a weaker and generally more realistic assumption, viz.:
Before the actual game is played any player, say A, can make a
binding offer to any other player, say B, to pay hima, after the
game is played, an explicitly declared amount of utility δ if B plays
a strategy s specified in the offer by A.
Building up upon this basic, unconditional, form of offer, we also consider a
more general setting, where players, without acting as a coalition, can propose a
game transformation to their fellow players, by making an offer under the condition
of receiving another offer in return, proposal that can, in turn, be accepted or
rejected. This newly obtained game transformation can be further modified, with
proposals made by other players, until an agreement is reached. When endowing
players with the possibility of playing such extra preplay moves, a whole bargaining
phase emerges before a normal form game is actually played. In other words, we can
think of the normal form game that is eventually played as an outcome of another
game, played beforehand, in which players engage in exchanging offers on strategies
of other players until an agreement is reached on the game to play.
Introducing an extensive-form bargaining structure preceding the play of a nor-
mal form game is relevant and important for the analysis of a wide spectrum of
economic, social and political situations, such as:
• political, labour-related or business negotiations and compromises between
non-cooperative parties,
• compensations, concessions, out-of-court settlements of legal cases, etc.,
• collusions between two or more parties in an economic activity, by exchang-
ing ‘behind the curtain’ agreements for mutual incentives,
• kickback schemes and other quasi-legal incentives,
• corruption schemes involving bribes in exchange of illegal favours.
Many situations such as the ones listed above are based on self-interested players
trying to influence the decision making of each other by means of explicit offers
of unilateral money transfers, should certain outcomes be realised, or of mutual
exchange of favours. For further details and discussions of these kinds of scenarios
aWe refer to player A as a female, while to B as a male. This choice is not for the sake of political
correctness but to make it easier to distinguish the players from the context.
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see for instance in Guttman [1978], Guttman [1987], Schelling [1960] and Segal
[1999]. The game-theoretic modelling and analysis of such scenarios is the main
motivation of the present work.
Agreements in such economic and political negotiations are usually reached
in dynamic bargaining processes made of offers and counteroffers, rather than a
one-shot simultaneous proposal ending the talks. The literature in economic the-
ory abounds with examples of parties entering negotiations to overcome inefficient
resource allocation, as well as schemes of side payments, compensatory mecha-
nisms, etc., which we review in detail in Section 6. Here we only mention some
more recent studies of preplay contracting in games that consider one-shot si-
multaneous, in Jackson and Wilkie [2005], Elligsen and Paltseva[2011], or two-
step, in Yamada [2005], offers preceding the actual game play and conditional
on the entire strategy profile (see discussion in Section 6), which makes an es-
sential difference in the analysis. Somewhat surprisingly, however, a systematic
study of the extensive-form negotiation process preceding the actual game play
seems still to be missing in the literature. With this paper we initiate such sys-
tematic study purporting to fill this gap, by formalising and studying the ne-
gotiation process preceding the actual game play as a bargaining among the
players on the game to play, thus drawing connections with modern bargaining
theory, in particular, Rubinstein’s model of bargaining games Rubinstein [1982];
Osborne and Rubinstein [1994]. We discuss our framework in more detail in Sec-
tion 2, illustrate and discuss preplay offers and offer-induced game transformations
in Section 3 and introduce normal form games with preplay negotiations phase in
Section 4. Then we analyse the case with conditional offers in Section 5, where
we obtain results for existence of efficient negotiation strategies of both players,
significantly extending our previous work in Goranko and Turrini [2013]. We end
the paper with discussion of related work in Section 6 and concluding remarks and
directions for further study in Section 7.
2. Non-cooperative games with preplay offers:
the conceptual framework
In this section we provide a more detailed description of preplay offers, discuss
some motivating examples, and lay down several extra conditions that play a role
in determining the outcome of the negotiation phase.
2.1. Nature and structure of preplay offers
We assume that any preplay offer by A to B is binding for A, conditional on B
playing the strategy s specified by A.
However, such offer does not create any obligation for B and therefore it does
not transform the game into a cooperative one, for B is still at liberty to choose
his strategy when the game is actually played. In particular, after her offer A does
not know before the game is played whether B will play the desired by A strategy
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s, and will thus make use of the offer, or not. Furthermore, several such offers
can be made, possibly by different players, so the possible rational behaviours of
the payers game maintain, in principle, all their complexity. The key observation
applying to this assumption, is that after any binding preplay offer is made, the
game remains a standard non-cooperative normal form game, only the payoff matrix
changes according to the offer.
2.2. Motivating examples
First, we introduce the following notation: A
δ/σB−−−→ B denotes an offer made by
player A to pay an amount δ to player B after the play of the game if player B
plays strategy σB .
Prisoners’ Dilemma 1 Consider a standard version of the Prisoner’ s Dilemma
(PD) game in Figure 1. The only Nash Equilibrium (NE) of the game is (D,D),
C D
C 4, 4 0, 5
D 5, 0 1, 1
Fig. 1. Prisoner’s Dilemma 1
yielding a payoff of (1, 1). Now, suppose Row
2/C−−−→ Column, that is, player Row
makes to the player Column a binding offer to pay her 2 units of utility (hereafter,
utils) after the game if Column plays C. That offer transforms the game by trans-
ferring 2 utils from the payoff of Row to the payoff of Column in every entry of the
column where Column plays C, as pictured in Figure 2.
C D
C 2, 6 0, 5
D 3, 2 1, 1
Fig. 2. An offer to cooperate by player Row.
In this game player Row still has the incentiveb to play D, which strictly dom-
inates C for him, but the dominant strategy for Column now is C, and thus the
only Nash equilibrium is (D,C) with payoff (3, 2) – strictly dominating the original
payoff (1, 1).
bIntuitively, having the incentive to play a strategy should be understood as realising that that
strategy is not dominated. Later on we will provide a formal and abstract notion of equilibrium,
which will rule out dominated strategies to be part of the solution of a game.
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Thus, even though player Row will still defect, the offer he has made to player
Column makes it strictly better for Column to cooperate.
Of course, Column can now realize that if player Row is to cooperate, then
Column would be even better off, but for that an extra incentive for Row is needed.
That incentive can be created by an offer Column
2/C−−−→ Row , that is, if Column, too,
makes an offer to Row to pay him 2 utils after the game, if player Row cooperates.
Then the game transforms, as in Figure 3.
C D
C 4, 4 2, 3
D 3, 2 1, 1
Fig. 3. A second offer, by player Column.
In this game, the only Nash equilibrium is (C,C) with payoff (4, 4), which is
also Pareto optimal. Note that this is the same payoff for (C,C) as in the original
PD game, but now both players have created incentives for their opponents to
cooperate, and have thus escaped from the trap of the original inefficient Nash
equilibrium (D,D).
Remark 1 Clearly, preplay offers can only work in case when at least part of the
received payoff can actually be transferred from a player to another. They obviously
cannot apply to scenarios such as the original PD, where one prisoner cannot offer
to the other to stay in prison for him, even if they could communicate before the
play.
Prisoners’ Dilemma 2 Consider another version of the Prisoner’ s Dilemma game
in Figure 4. The only Nash Equilibrium in this game is (DRow, DCol), yielding the
C D
C 4, 4 0, 5
D 5, 0 3, 3
Fig. 4. Prisoner’s Dilemma 2
Pareto dominated payoff of (3, 3). Now, note that none of the players can make a
feasible first offer to improve the outcome. Indeed, in order to provide a sufficient
incentive for Column to play CCol, Row would have to offer him more than 3, which
is unfeasible for Row because it would put him in a disadvantaged position. Likewise
for Column.
Thus, by consecutive exchange of unilateral preplay offers rational players cannot
realise the opportunity to play the Pareto optimal outcome (CRow, CCol).
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This problem can be avoided if we allow conditional offers as follows: Row can
make an offer Row
3/CCol−−−−−→ Column, but now, conditional on Column making to
Row the matching counter-offer Column
3/CRow−−−−−→ Row , which we hereafter denote
as Row
3/CCol | 3/CRow−−−−−−−−−−−→ Row . The idea is that, unlike the so far considered uncon-
ditional offers, Row ’s conditional offer is only confirmed and enforced if Row does
make the required counter-offer, else it is cancelled and nullified before the play of
the game.
We will introduce formally and discuss conditional offers in detail further.
2.3. Additional optional assumptions
There are several important additional assumptions that, depending on the par-
ticular scenarios under investigation may, or may not, be realistically made. We
therefore do not commit to any of them, but we acknowledge that each of them can
make a significant difference in the behaviour and abilities of players to steer the
game in the best possible direction for them. So, we consider the possible options for
each of them separately and study the consequences under the various combinations
of assumptions.
The nature and value of time. Time in the preplay negotiations is measured
discretely as the number of explicitly defined steps/rounds of the negotiations, It
may or may not have value, i.e. players may, or may not, strictly prefer a reward in
the present to the same reward in the future. Moreover, time may have the same
value for all players, or may be more, or less, valuable for each of them depending
on their patience.
• In the case when time is of no value, players can keep making offers at no
extra cost.
• In the case when time is of value, making unacceptable or suboptimal offers
should intuitively lead to inefficient negotiation and, consequently, strate-
gies involving such offers would not be subgame perfect equilibrium strate-
gies. This intuition is confirmed by our technical results.
The order of making offers. The order in which offers are made by the
different players can be essential, especially in case of irrevocable offers. In such
cases we assume that the order in which players can make offers is set by a separate,
exogenous protocol which is an added component of the preplay negotiations game;
for instance, it can be strictly alternating or random. Alternatively, the offers may
be required to be made simultaneously by all players, as in Jackson and Wilkie
[2005] and Elligsen and Paltseva[2011], however we do not consider this option, as
the aim of our paper is to make the structure of preplay negotiations explicit in the
models.
Conditionality of offers. As discussed earlier, offers may be unconditional, i.e.,
not subject to acceptance or rejection by the player to whom the offer is made, or
conditional upon an expected (suggested or demanded) counter-offer by the player
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to whom the offer was made. Acceptance of a conditional offer means both accep-
tance of the offer and making the expected counter-offer. We emphasise that after
acceptance, a conditional offer does not constitute a contract between the players
turning the game into a cooperative one, but only a pair of unilateral offers, each
binding only its proposer. It therefore transforms the current game into another
non-cooperative game. Rejection of a conditional offer means cancellation of both of
the unconditional offers of which it consists. The option of rejection of conditional
offers can be reasonably assumed under some circumstances (e.g. possibility for ex-
tended communication and for a low-cost negotiations), but not in others. We will
consider both cases separately.
3. Preplay offers and induced game transformations
In this section we describe the game transformations induced by preplay offers in a
general and more technical fashion.
Before proceeding further, we need to make two important clarifying remarks.
(1) Consistently with the approach taken in the literature on non-cooperative games
with transferrable utility, the value that players attach to outcomes can be
transferred among them. This, however, is not the same as saying that players
are only dealing with money or with a unique currency. Yet, it does assume
that players’ utilities can be transformed into ones based on a common unique
unit of measure that can be transferred at no cost.
(2) We are assuming the existence of a mechanism which allows players to make
their offers binding. Our analysis is therefore only applicable to scenarios in
which this assumption can be met. It can be implemented in practice in various
ways, e.g., by a legal contract (but only stipulating the accepted offers, not
prescribing the actions that the players will take in the actual game), a trusted
third party, a mediator, or any other empowered institution. While assuming
the existence of such mechanism, we abstract away from analysing its inner
rules and procedures.
3.1. Transformations of normal form games by preplay offers
B1 · · · Bj · · ·
A1 · · · · · · a1j , b1j · · ·
A2 · · · · · · a2j , b2j · · ·
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
Ai · · · · · · aij , bij · · ·
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
Fig. 5. A general 2-player game
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Here we formally define the notion of transformation induced by a preplay offers.
For technical convenience we consider general 2-player game with a payoff matrix
given in Figure 5; the case of N-player games is a straightforward generalisation.
Suppose player A makes a preplay offer to player B to pay her additional utilityc
α ≥ 0 if B plays Bj . Recall that we denote such offer by A α/Bj−−−−→ B. It transforms
the payoff matrix of the game as indicated in Figure 6.
B1 · · · Bj · · ·
A1 · · · · · · a1j − α, b1j + α · · ·
A2 · · · · · · a2j − α, b2j + α · · ·
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
Ai · · · · · · aij − α, bij + α · · ·
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
Fig. 6. A general 2-player game with an offer.
We will call such transformation of a payoff matrix a primitive offer-induced
transformation, or a POI-transformation, for short.
Several preplay offers can be made by each players. Clearly, the transformation
of a payoff matrix induced by several preplay offers can be obtained by applying
the POI-transformations corresponding to each of the offers consecutively, in any
order. We will call such transformations offer-induced transformations, or OI-
transformations, for short. Thus, every OI-transformation corresponds to a set of
preplay offers, respectively a set of POI-transformations. Note that the set generat-
ing a given OI-transformation need not be unique, e.g., A can make two independent
offers A
α1/Bj−−−−→ B and A α2/Bj−−−−→ B equivalent to the single offer A α1+α2/Bj−−−−−−−→ B.
The general mathematical theory of OI-transformations is studied in more detail
in Goranko[2012]. Here we only mention some observations about the game-theoretic
effects of OI-transformations, which will be useful later on.
(1) An OI-transformation does not change the sum of the payoffs of all players in
any outcome, only redistributes it. In particular, OI-transformations preserve
the class of zero-sum games.
(2) An OI-transformation induced by a preplay offer by player A does not change
the preferences of A regarding her own strategies. In particular, (weak or strict)
dominance between strategies of player A is invariant under OI-transformations
induced by preplay offers of A, i.e.: a strategy Ai dominates (weakly, resp.
strongly) a strategy Aj before a transformation induced by a preplay offer
made by A if and only if Ai dominates (weakly, resp. strongly) Aj after the
transformation.
cThe reason we allow vacuous offers with α = 0 is not only to have an identity transformation at
hand, but also because such offers can be used by players as signalling, to enable coordination.
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(3) The players can collude to make any designated outcome, with any redistribu-
tion of its payoffs, a dominant strategy equilibrium, by exchanging sufficiently
high offers to make the strategies generating that outcome with that redistri-
bution of the payoffs, strictly dominant.
Thus, preplay offers can transform the game matrix radically. However, we note
that not every matrix transformation that preserves the sums of the payoffs in
every outcome can be induced by preplay offers. In particular, this is the case if
the transformed matrix differs from the original one in only one payoff. For general
necessary and sufficient condition for a normal form game to be obtained from
another by preplay offers see Goranko[2012].
A central question arising is what should be regarded as a solution of a strategic
game allowing binding preplay offers. The possible answers to that question crucially
depend on the additional assumptions discussed earlier and on the procedure of
’preplay negotiations’; these will be discussed further.
3.2. Extending preplay offers and OI-transformations
3.2.1. Conditional offers
Unconditional offers always decrease the proponent’s payoff at some outcomes,
and hence making an unconditional offer comes with a cost. As in the Prison-
ers’ Dilemma 2 previously described, this can be a hindrance for making mutually
beneficial offers. Furthermore, we can easily think of real life situations where play-
ers who make such preplay offers expect some form of reciprocity from their fellow
players and make their offers conditional on an expected ‘return of favour’.
For these reasons, we now extend the preplay offers framework to enable players
to suggest a transformation of the starting game, by making a conditional offer to
an opponent for payment subject to playing a certain strategy, in exchange for a
similar ‘counter-offer’ from that opponent. More precisely, every conditional offer,
denoted as A
α/σB | β/ρA−−−−−−−−−→ B is associated with a suggested transformation of
the starting game G into a game G(X) where X = {A α/σB−−−−→ B,B β/ρA−−−→ A}.
Two responses of the recipient of a conditional offer A
α/σB | β/ρA−−−−−−−−−→ B are
possible: it can be accepted or rejected by the player receiving it. If rejected, the offer
is immediately cancelled and does not commit any of the players to any payment,
and therefore it does not induce any transformation of the game matrix. If accepted,
the actual transformation induced by the offer is the suggested transformation
defined above. Two important observations:
• an unconditional offer has the same effect as an accepted conditional offer with
a trivial counter-offer where β = 0.
• a conditional offer can be seen as the proposal of two separate unconditional
offers that can only be enforced together.
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Conditional offers can be made to different players. Multiple conditional offers
can be made to the same player, contingent upon same or different strategies of the
recipient and the proposer, too.
4. Normal form games with preplay negotiations phase
In this section we first give some technical preliminaries on normal form games and
their solution. Then we introduce normal form games with preplay negotiations.
We start out with an informal introduction, followed by a formal definition of their
structure, together with the notion of efficiency negotiation strategies.
4.1. Preliminaries: solution concepts and values of normal form
games
We will be using i, j, . . . for variables ranging over players, while A,B, . . . will denote
individual players.
4.1.1. Normal form games
Let G = (N, {Σi}i∈N , u) be a normal form game (hereafter abbreviated as NFG),
where N = {1, . . . , n} a finite set of players, {Σi}i∈N a family of strategies for each
player and u : N ×∏i∈N Σi → R is a payoff function assigning to each player
a utility for each strategy profile. The game is played by each player i choosing a
strategy from Σi. The resulting strategy profile σ is the outcome of the play and
ui(σ) = u(i, σ) is the associated payoff for i. An outcome of a play of the game G
is called maximal if it is a Pareto optimal outcome with the highest sum of the
payoffs of all players.
4.1.2. Solution concepts and solutions of normal form games
Let GN be the set of all normal form games for a set of players N . By solution
concept for GN we mean a map S that associates with each G ∈ GN a non-empty
set S(G) of outcomes of G, called the S-solution of the game. At times we will
talk about players’ strategies that are consistent with some solution concept. For
a player i, we denote Si to be the restriction of the mapping S to i returning,
instead of full outcomes, only strategies of player i consistent with S in the sense
that Si(G) = {σi ∈ Σi | σ ∈ S(G)}. Slightly abusing notation we will also consider
mappings of the form S−i to indicate the mapping S(G) restricted to player i’s
opponents. Solution concepts formalise the concepts of rationality of the players
in the strategic games. A S-solution of a strategic game G basically tells us what
outcomes of the game the players could, or should, select in an actual play of that
game, if they adopt the solution concept S.
In this work we do not commit to a specific solution concept for the normal form
games but we assume that the one adopted by the players satisfies the necessary
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condition that every outcome in any solution prescribed by that solution concept
must survive iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies. We will call such
solution concepts acceptable. This condition reflects the assumption that players
would never play strategies that are dominated, and that this exclusion is a common
knowledge amongst them and can be used in their strategic reasoning. Thus, the
weakest acceptable solution concept is the one that returns all outcomes surviving
iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies.
Games for which the solution concept S returns a single outcome will be called
S-solved. For instance, every game with a strongly dominating strategy profile is
S-solved for any acceptable solution concept S. Games for which S returns only
maximal outcomes will be called optimally S-solvable. If for every player all
these maximal outcomes provide the same payoffs, we call the game perfectly S-
solvable. Games that are S-solved and perfectly S-solvable (i.e., S returns one
maximal outcome) will be called S-perfectly solved.
The ultimate objective of a preplay negotiation is to transform the starting NFG
into a perfectly S-solvable one. Ideally, it should be a S-perfectly solved one, but
this is not always possible: cf. any symmetric Coordination game.
4.1.3. Players’ expected values of a game
It is necessary for the preplay negotiation phase that will be introduced later for
each player to have an expected value of any NFG that can be played. Naturally,
that expected value would depend not only on the game but also on the adopted
solution concept and on the player’s level of risk tolerance. A risk-averse player
would assign as expected value the minimum of his payoffs over all outcomes in the
respective solution, while a risk-neutral player could take the probabilistic expected
value of these payoffs, etc. Note that the expected value of any S-solved game for
any player i naturally should equal the payoff for i from the only outcome in the
solution.
For sake of definiteness, unless otherwise specified further, we adopt here the
conservative, risk-averse approach and will define for every acceptable solution con-
cept S, game G and a player i, the expected value of G for i relative to the solution
concept S to be:
vSi (G) = max
σi∈Si(G)
min
σ−i∈S−i(G)
ui(σ)
4.2. Normal form games with preplay negotiations phase:
informal introduction
Our setting for normal form games with preplay offers begins with a given ‘starting’
normal form game G and consists of two phases:
• A preplay negotiation phase, where players negotiate on how to transform the
game G by making unconditional offers, accepting or rejecting conditional offers
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they receive. This phase constitutes an extensive form game, which we call a
preplay negotiation game (PNG).
• An actual play phase where, after having agreed on some OI-transformation X
in the previous phase, the players play the resulting game G(X).
Players’ moves in the preplay negotiation phase should intuitively be understood
as based on strategies that players follow in order to modify the starting normal
form game in the best for them possible way, before they get to play it.
Players engage in preplay negotiations with the purpose of reaching a best for
them possible agreement based on OI transformation of the original game G. Major
questions that we set out to study are:
• What constitutes an optimal/rational/efficient negotiation strategy and what are
the expected outcome(s) when players follow such strategies?
• In particular, when can players agree upon Pareto optimal outcomes in their
preplay negotiations if playing rationally?
• What can, or should, players agree upon in the preplay negotiations phase when
the original game has several Pareto optimal outcomes?
Further we introduce, first informally and then fully formally, the setup of PNGs
as extensive-form bargaining games, including the concepts of moves and histories,
the order of moves, the possibility of players come to a disagreement, and finally a
notion of solution for these games.
4.3. Moves, histories and preplay negotiations games
Depending on some of the optional assumptions, the players can have several possi-
ble moves in the preplay negotiations phase. Let us consider the most general case,
based on conditional offers. Then the moves available to the player whose turn is
to play depend on whether or not he has received any conditional offers since his
previous move. If so, we say that the player has pending conditional offers. The
possible moves of the player in turn are as follows.
(1) If the player has no pending conditional offers, he can:
(a) Make an offer (conditional or not).
(b) Pass.
(c) (Optional) Opt out (see Section 4.5).
(2) If the player has pending conditional offers, for each of them he can:
(a) Accept the pending offer by making the requested counter-offer to the player
who has made the conditional offer, and then make an offer of his/her own
or pass or opt out (when available).
(b) Reject the pending offer, and then make an offer of his/her own or pass or
opt out (when available).
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If all players have passed at their last move, or any player has opted out, the
preplay negotiations game is over.
We say that an offer of the game is passing if its acceptance by the opponents
is followed by a pass of the proponent. In other words, the one making the offer
would be happy to end the game with the suggested transformation. Likewise, an
acceptance is passing if, once declared, it is followed by a pass move of the same
player. In other words, with a passing acceptance a player declares agreement to
terminate the game with the proposed transformation. When opting out is not
allowed, passing moves (i.e. offers or acceptances that are passing), are the only
way for players to terminate the game in agreement and the only way to effectively
deviate from undesired outcomes.
We now define the notion of a history in the preplay negotiations phase as a
finite or infinite sequence of admissible moves by the players who take their turns
according to an externally set protocol (see further). Every finite history in such a
game is associated with the current NFG: the result of the OI-transformation of
the starting game by all offers that are so far made and accepted. The current NFG
of the empty history is the input NFG of the preplay negotiations game.
A play of a preplay negotiations game is any finite history at the end of which
the preplay negotiations game is over, or any infinite history.
In order to eventually define realistic solution concepts for preplay negotiations
games we need to endow every history in such games with value for every player.
Intuitively, the value of a history is the value for the player of the current NFG
associated with that history in the case of non-valuable time, and the same value
accordingly discounted in the case of valuable time.
Now, a preplay negotiation game (PNG) can be defined generically as a
turn-based, possibly infinite, extensive form game that starts with an input NFG
G and either ends with a transformed game G′ or goes on forever, which we discuss
further. The outcome of a play of the PNG is the resulting transformed game
G′ in the former case and ’Disagreement’ (briefly D) in the latter case.
The fact that we are using the term preplay to denote the negotiation phase,
as well as the term actual game play to denote strategy selection in the normal
form game, should not be interpreted as the negotiation phase being ”virtual” or
not taking place in reality. Just like in a bargaining game (Osborne and Rubinstein
[1994]), players play a real negotiation game before making their final decisions,
according to an exogenously determined protocol. As noted above, the preplay ne-
gotiations games take place in discrete time, measured not as “calendar” time but
as the number of moves in the negotiation game, where every move is assumed
to take one time unit. The time duration of the preplay negotiation is not set in
advance, but, as it will become clear further, the players have no incentive to delay
forever, and when time is valuable for them they have the incentive to complete the
negotiation as quickly as possible. This is different from other treatments of virtual
and endogenously determined time, as in e.g., Hamilton and Slutsky [1990].
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4.4. Preplay negotiation games formally
Here we provide a formal definition for the general N-player case of preplay negoti-
ation games.
Definition 2 (Preplay negotiation game) A preplay negotiation game is a tu-
ple E = (N,G,S,A,H, turn, {Σi}i∈N,g, out,u), where:
• N is the set of players.
• G is the starting normal form game.
• S is an acceptable solution concept for normal form games.
• A is a set of actions, or moves of types as discussed earlier.
• H is a non-empty set of finite or infinite sequences of actions, called histories,
that includes the empty sequence  and is prefix-closed, meaning that every
prefix of a history in H belongs to H, and limit-closed, meaning that the infinite
union of a chain by extension of finite histories in H belongs to H, too.
A history h ∈ H is terminal in H if it is infinite or there is no history in
H extending it. The set of terminal histories in H is denoted by Ht and the set
of finite histories in H by Hf .
For h, h′ ∈ Hf and o ∈ A we denote by h; o the extension of h with the
action o and by h;h′ the concatenation of h with h′. XX
• turn : H\Ht → N is the turn function, assigning the players who are to move
at non-terminal histories. We denote Hi := turn−1(i) for each i ∈ N the set of
histories where it is i’s turn to play.
Here we assume that the turned function is exogenously defined, e.g. in some
fixed cyclic order or depending on the last move made.
• Σi, for each i ∈ N , is a non-empty set of strategies σi : Hi → A that assigns
an action for i to any non-terminal history in Hi.
• g : H → GN is a function associating to each finite history the currently
accepted NFG, defined below.
• out :∏i∈N Σi → Ht is an outcome play function, assigning to each strategy
profile σ the terminal history out(σ) generated by σ.
Respectively, the outcome NFG of σ is g(out(σ)).
• u : N → (Ht → R) is the utility function of the PNG, associating to each
player the payoff function ui such that ui(z) = v
S
i(g(z)) for every finite z ∈
Ht. Further, for z, z′ ∈ Ht, with z finite and z′ infinite, we require that ui(z) ≥
ui(z
′) for all players i, and uj(z) > uj(z′) for some j, i.e., no disagreement is
better for all players than any agreement.
Now we define the function g. Its intended meaning is that g(h) would be the
outcome of the PNG if the game ended at h. Its precise definition depends on the
repertoire of moves that are allowed in the PNG, as follows:
• g() is the starting normal form game G.
• If h = h′; o, where the last move o is an unconditional offer, then g(h) =
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g(h′)(o), i.e., the transformation of g(h′) by the offer o.
• If h = h′; a, where the last move a is an acceptance of a conditional offer o,
then g(h) = g(h′)(o).
• In all other cases of actions a, g(h; a) = g(h).
Solution of PNG. By solution of a PNG we mean the set of all transformed
normal form games g(h) for all outcomes h of plays effected by subgame perfect
equilibrium (SPE) strategy profiles in the PNG.
4.5. Disagreements
Clearly, players would only be interested in making preplay offers inducing payoffs
that are “optimal” for them. Therefore, rational players are expected to “negotiate”
in the preplay phase the play of Pareto optimal outcomes. In particular, if the game
has a unique strictly Pareto dominant outcome then the players can negotiate a
transformation of the game to make it the (unique) dominant strategy equilibrium.
Yet, players that are getting lesser shares of the total payoff may still want to nego-
tiate a redistribution, so even in this case the outcome of the preplay negotiations
is not a priori obvious. In particular, there is no guarantee that the PNG will ever
terminate, i.e. that its solution is non-empty.
The PNG may terminate if all players pass at some stage, in which case we
say that the players have reached agreement, or may go on forever, in which case
the players have failed to reach agreement; we call such situation a (passive) dis-
agreement and we denote any such infinite history with D. We will not discuss
disagreements and their consequences here, but will make the explicit assumption
that any agreement is better for every player than disagreement in terms of the
payoffs, by assigning payoffs of −∞ in the entire game for each player if the PNG
evolves as a disagreement. However, we also outline a more flexible and possibly
more realistic alternative, whereby players can explicitly express tentative agree-
ments with the status quo before every move they make, essentially by saying “So
far so good, but let me try to improve the game further by offering . . . ”, or express
disagreements, by essentially saying “No, I am not happy with the way the negoti-
ations have developed since the last time I agreed, so I’d like to improve the game
by offering instead . . . ”. This type of negotiations involves, besides the other moves
listed above, also formal statements of acceptance or non-acceptance of the current
NFG, where the input NFG is automatically accepted by all players and at every
stage of the negotiations, the current NFG is the one on which they are currently
negotiating by making offers, whereas the currently accepted NFG is the last cur-
rent one for which all players have explicitly stated acceptance. Then if at any stage
of the PNG any player is currently unhappy and realises that he cannot improve
further because of the other players not willing to accept his best conditional offers,
then he can terminate the negotiations by explicitly opting out, which would leave
as an outcome game the currently accepted NFG.
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4.5.1. Efficient negotiation strategies
Definition 3 (Efficient negotiation strategies) A strategy in the PNG is an
efficient negotiation strategy if it only involves making (minimal) feasible offers
and it passes once they are accepted. It is strongly efficient if the vector of payoffs
of the outcome it attains is a redistribution of the vector of payoffs of a maximal
outcome.
A number of important relevant questions arise:
• Is it the case that every subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) strategy of a PNG
is an efficient negotiation strategy and vice versa?
• If not, can the inefficient ones be replaced by efficient ones generating the same,
or at least as good solution?
• Under what conditions can a given (maximal) Pareto optimal outcome in the
starting NFG become the unique outcome of the final NFG?
To answer these questions we need an analysis of the solutions of the PNG game.
Further we provide such partial analysis for the case of two players.
5. Two-players preplay negotiation games with conditional offers
In this section we allow the possibility of players to make conditional offers to each
other and obtain results about the efficiency of the resulting negotiation process
and its possible outcomes, under several optional assumptions.
Before analysing some cases with additional optional assumptions, let us state
a useful general result, also valid in the case of many players PNG. An extensive
form game is said to have the One Deviation Property (ODP) Osborne and
Rubinstein [1994], Lemma 98.2 if, in order to check that a strategy profile is a Nash
equilibrium in (some subgame of) that game, it suffices to consider the possible
profitable deviations of each player not amongst all of its strategies (in that sub-
game), but only amongst the ones differing from the considered profile in the first
subsequent move.
Lemma 4 Every PNG has the One Deviation Property.
Proof. Let E = (N,A,H, turn, {ΣA,ΣB}, o,G,S,g,u) be a PNG, and Hf ⊆ H the
set of finite histories in H. Let moreover Ef be the restriction of E to Hf , where
the individual components are defined in the expected way. But Ef is a game of
finite horizon, and by Osborne and Rubinstein [1994], Lemma 98.2 it has the One
Deviation Property. But by the fact that no disagreement is better for any player
than any agreement, (Definition 2) then E has that property, too.
Furthermore, to analyse equilibrium strategies of PNG we consider so called sta-
tionary acceptance strategies where players have a minimal acceptance thresh-
October 14, 2015 15:17 WSPC/INSTRUCTION FILE ”Goranko-Turrini
Final Version-VG”
Two-player preplay negotiation games with conditional offers 17
old d and a minimal passing threshold d′ ≥ d (both of which may vary among the
players).
5.1. Conditional offers with non-valuable time
The value for a player of a history in a PNG is the value for the player of the
current NFG associated with that history. When time is not valuable players assign
the same value to the NFG associated with the current moment and the same game
associated with any other moment in the future, which means that players can
afford a delay.
Proposition 5 Every SPE strategy profile of stationary acceptance strategies of a
two-player PNG with non-valuable time is strongly efficient.
Proof. Suppose not. Let d− be a vector of expected values that is not the redistri-
bution of a maximal outcome of the starting game, associated to some SPE strategy
profile. Such strategy profile yields a history h that ends with: 1) proposal of d−;
2) acceptance of that proposal; 3) pass; 4) pass. Consider now some redistribution
d∗ of a maximal outcome where both players get more than in d− and the his-
tory h with the the last four steps substituted by: 1) proposal of d∗; 2) acceptance
of that proposal; 3) pass; 4) pass. By stationarity of strategies and the ODP, the
player moving at step 1) is better off deviating from d− and instead proposing d∗:
a contradiction.
The condition of stationarity of acceptance strategies is needed if we want to
prevent SPE that lead to inefficiency. Indeed, if players were not adhering to sta-
tionary acceptance strategies there could be a suboptimal outcome, guaranteeing
for both players expected values respectively of dA and dB . To enforce that out-
come it then suffices to design a strategy profile whereby off the equilibrium path
player A threatens player B with a stubborn but maximal stationary acceptance
strategy giving him less than dB , while player B threatens A with an expected
payoff of strictly less than dA. So, if players are not obliged to be consistent in their
acceptance policies, dA and dB can be the result of a subgame perfect equilibrium
strategy.
The example below provides a detailed instance of such games.
Example 6 (Attaining inefficiency) In what follows we say that a player ‘pro-
poses a given outcome with a given payoff distribution’ to mean that the player
makes a conditional offer which, when accepted, would make that specific outcome,
with that specific distribution of the payoffs, the unique (dominant strategy equilib-
rium) outcome in the solution of the transformed game. More generally, we say that
a player ”proposes a payoff distribution” to mean that the player makes a condi-
tional offer which, when accepted, would make that specific payoff distribution the
vector of expected utilities of the players.
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Consider the starting NFG on Figure 7. As there are no dominant strategy
equilibria, there are acceptable solution concepts assigning 2 to each player.
L R
U 2, 2 4, 3
D 3, 3 2, 2
Fig. 7. Attaining inefficient divisions
We now will construct a strategy profile of the PNG starting from that game,
that is a SPE strategy profile and attains an inefficient outcome:
(1) At the root node player A proposes outcome (D,L) with payoffs (3, 3).
(2) After such proposal player B accepts. However, if A had made a different offer
(so, off the equilibrium path) B would reject and keep proposing outcome (U,R)
with distribution of 5 for him and 2 for A and accepting (and passing on)
maximal outcomes guaranteeing him at least 5. A, on the other hand, would
not have better option than proposing the same distribution (5 for B and 2 for
her) and accepting only maximal outcomes guaranteeing her at least 2. Notice
that once they enter this subgame neither A nor B can profitably deviate from
such distribution.
(3) If, however, B did not accept the (3, 3) deal then A would keep proposing out-
come (U,R) with a redistribution of (5, 2) (5 for her, 2 for him) and accepting
at least that much. Respectively, B would also stick to the same distribution,
accepting at least 2. Again, no player can profitably deviate from this stationary
strategy profile starting from B’s rejection.
(4) After player B has accepted the deal (3, 3), then A passes. If A did not pass,
player B would go back to his (2, 5) redistribution threat.
Likewise with the next round. That eventually leads to the inefficient out-
come (3, 3).
It is easy to check that the strategy profile described above is a SPE. No player
can at any point deviate profitably by proposing the outcome (U,L) with dominating
payoff distribution, e.g., (3.5, 3.5) .
We first focus on PNG where the opt out option is not available, and introduce
it as an additional feature later on.
Negotiations without ’opt out’ moves. In PNG with non-valuable time and
without the possibility of opting out every redistribution of a maximal outcome can
be attained as a solution.
Proposition 7 Let E be PNG with non-valuable time starting from a NFG G and
let d = (xA, xB) be any redistribution of a maximal outcome of the starting NFG.
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The following strategy profile σ = (σA, σB) is a SPE:
For each player i ∈ {A,B}:
• if i is the first player to move, he proposes a transformation of G where the
vector of expected values in the transformed game is d;
• when i can make an offer and the previously made offer has not been accepted,
he proposes a transformation of the current NFG where the vector of expected
values in the transformed game is d;
• when i can make an offer and the previously made offer has been accepted, he
passes;
• when i has a pending offer of a suggested transformation where the vector of
expected values in the transformed game is d′, he accepts it if and only if x′i ≥ xi,
and rejects it otherwise;
• if i can pass and the other player has just passed, he passes;
• if i can pass and the opponent has not just passed, i proposes d;
• if i has just accepted a proposal he passes;
Proof. We have to show that there is no subgame where a player i can profitably
deviate from this strategy at its root. By Lemma 4 it suffices to consider only first
move deviations to the above described strategy.
Suppose the player has a pending offer that induces a transformation of the
current NFG where the vector of expected values is d∗. If she accepts it then the
outcome will be d∗, due to the definition of the strategy profile; if she rejects it,
it will be the starting offer d. And she will accept if and only if she will get more
from d∗ than from d. So the acceptance component is optimal. For the remaining
cases, if player i deviates from the prescribed strategy, due to the construction of
the strategy and Lemma 4, the vector of payoffs associated to the outcome of E will
be d anyway.
Corollary 8 The game associated to the outcome of a subgame perfect equilibrium
strategy profile consisting of stationary acceptance strategies in a two-player PNG
with non-valuable time is optimally solvable.
In summary, our analysis of two-player PNG with non-valuable time shows that
efficiency can be attained when conditional offers are allowed and stationary ac-
ceptance strategies are followed. Indeed, any redistribution of the vector of payoffs
of a maximal outcome can be made the unique solution of the final NFG by such
SPE strategies. However, non-stationary acceptance strategies may lead to ineffi-
cient equilibria, as Example 6 clearly shows: there exist SPE strategy profiles of a
two-player PNG with conditional offers and non-valuable time where (i) offers are
made that are not feasible, (ii) the vector of payoffs of the outcome it attains is not
a redistribution of the vector of payoffs of a maximal outcome, i.e., it is not strongly
efficient.
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Negotiations with ‘opt out’ moves. To address the issues related to possible
inefficiency we consider the possibility for players to make an opt out move and
unilaterally put an end to the negotiations, by making the currently accepted NFG
the outcome of the whole PNG.
Proposition 9 Let σ be a subgame perfect equilibrium strategy profile of a PNG
with opt out move and let h be the resulting history. Then σ guarantees to all players
at least as much as they had in the currently accepted NFG; in particular, at least
as much as in the original game.
Proof. Starting with the original, automatically accepted game, each currently
accepted NFG must make each player better off than in the previous one; otherwise
opting out would be a profitable deviation.
By introducing the possibility of opting out, the set of subgame perfect equilibria
reduces further. Strategies, such as the one described in Example 6 demanding an
unreasonably high reward or an unreasonably low one for the proponent, will not
be equilibria anymore. However, this option does not solve the problem of attaining
inefficiency, as the comment to Proposition 5 still applies. It has, however, several
advantages: first, the equilibrium strategies of the PNG will guarantee for both
players at least the expected payoff of the starting NFG; and second, the threat
of opting out gives the players the possibility of making a more effective use of
unconditional offers.
To sum up, while SPE strategies in a two-player PNG can attain efficiency, some
important issues are still remaining:
• some SPE strategies, e.g., non-stationary acceptance strategies, are not strongly
efficient.
• players can keep making unfeasible moves as a part of a SPE strategy, i.e., there
are forms of equilibria where some players strictly decrease their expected payoff
with respect to the original game;
• even strongly efficient strategies do not always yield perfectly solved games, as
there is no notion of most fair redistribution of the payoff vectors in the solution
of the original game.
Thus, when time is of no value, even the possibility of making conditional offers
does not guarantee that fair and efficient outcomes are ever reached.
5.2. Conditional offers with valuable time
We will show here that when time is of value the problems mentioned above can be
at least partially solved. To impose value on time we introduce for each player i a
payoff discounting factor δi ∈ (0, 1) applied at every round of the PNG associated to
offers that are made to his payoffs. These factors measure the players’ impatience,
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i.e., how much they value time, and reduce the payoffs accordingly as time goes by.
Thus, the players have no interest in delaying the negotiations by making redundant
moves and sub-optimal offers. The intuition now, which we will justify further, is
that for the sake of time efficiency, in a SPE strategy profile:
(1) If a player intends to make an offer, she has never made any earlier offer that,
if accepted, would give her a lesser value of the resulting game.
(2) If any player is ever going to accept a given offer (or any other offer which is
at least as good for her) she should do it the first time when she receives such
offer.
In analysing PNG with valuable time we consider several cases, depending on
whether opting out is allowed.
5.2.1. No opting out
For technical reasons we impose some additional constraints:
• every game associated with a history of a PNG does not have in its solution
outcomes assigning negative utility to players. NB: we do allow payoff vectors
consisting of negative reals to be present in the game matrix, only we do not
allow such vectors to be associated to outcomes in the solution. This constraint
has several practical consequences:
– players’ expected payoffs decrease in time, i.e., the discounting factor δ has
always a negative effect on the expected payoff.
– players can make offers that redistribute the payoff vectors associated with
outcomes in the solution, leaving some nonnegative amount to each player
and some strictly positive amount to some.
• each player’s expected payoff at a disagreement history is assumed 0.
We will use the following notational conventions:
• (x, t) denotes the payoff vector x at time t, where each component xi is dis-
counted by δti ; (x, t)i is the payoff of player i in the vector x at t.
• GX will denote the set of all possible redistributions of payoffs of outcomes in
a NFG G that assign nonnegative payoffs to all players. This set is compact,
but generally not connected, as in the bargaining games of [4]. However, it is a
finite union of compact and connected sets, and that will suffice to generalise
the results from [4] that we need.
The following properties of every 2-person PNG with valuable time starting from
a given NFG G are the four fundamental assumptions of the bargaining model in
Rubinstein [1982] and Osborne and Rubinstein [1994], p.122.
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(1) For each x, y ∈ GX such that x 6= y, if (x, 0)i = (y, 0)i then (x, 0)−i 6= (y, 0)−i.
This holds because the set GX is made by payoff vectors and subtracting some
payoff to a player means adding it to the other.
(2) (bi, 1)−i = (bi, 0)−i = (D)−i, where bi is the highest payoff that i obtains in
GX and (D)−i the payoff for −i in any disagreement history. As bi is the best
agreement for player i it is also the worst one for player −i.
(3) If x is Pareto optimal amongst the payoff vectors in GX then, by definition
of GX , there is no y with (x, 0)i ≥ (y, 0)i for each i ∈ N . Moreover, x is a
redistribution of a maximal outcome in G.
(4) There is a unique pair (x∗, y∗) with x∗, y∗ ∈ GX such that (x∗, 1)A =
(y∗, 0)A and (y∗, 1)B = (x∗, 0)B and both x∗, y∗ are Pareto optimal amongst
the payoff vectors in GX .
The first 3 statements above are quite straightforward. To see the last one, let
x∗ = (x∗A, x
∗
B) and y
∗ = (y∗A, y
∗
B) and let the sum of the payoffs in any maximal
outcome in G be d. Then (x∗A, x∗B , y∗A, y∗B) is the unique solution of the following,
clearly consistent and determined system of equations:
yA = δAxA, xB = δByB , xA + xB = d, yA + yB = d.
The solution (see also Osborne and Rubinstein [1994]) is:
xA = d
1− δB
1− δAδB ; yA = δAd
1− δB
1− δAδB
xB = δBd
1− δA
1− δAδB ; yB = d
1− δA
1− δAδB .
Relation with bargaining games In the rest of the section we will explicitly
view preplay negotiation as a bargaining process on how to play the starting nor-
mal form game. Using our observations and assumptions, we can adapt the results
from Osborne and Rubinstein [1994] to show that when time is valuable not only all
equilibria consisting of stationary acceptance strategies attain efficiency but they
also do so by redistributing the payoff vector in relation to players’ impatience. Sta-
tionary acceptance strategies will be needed to focus only on the maximal connected
subspace of the set GX . We extend the efficiency and fairness results obtained in
Osborne and Rubinstein [1994] for bargaining games of the type of ‘division of a
cake’ to somewhat more general bargaining games of the type where players have
to choose a cake from a set of cakes, of possibly different sizes and divide it. Our
claim, in a nutshell, is that, when players employ stationary acceptance strategies,
they immediately choose the largest cake and then bargain on how to divide it.
First, recall that in our framework time passes as new offers are made. So, from
a technical point if the PNG start with a game that is already perfectly solved, the
player moving first will not be punished by passing immediately.
Then, without restriction of the generality of our analysis, we can assume a
unique discounting factor for both players. Indeed, the discount factor of e.g., player
A can be made equal to that of B while preserving the relative preferences of A on
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the set of outcomes by suitably re-scaling the payoffs of A in the input NFG, and
therefore the expected value for A of that game; for technical details see Osborne
and Rubinstein [1994], p.119 following an idea of Fishburn and Rubinstein quoted
there.
Now we are ready to state the main result for this case:
Theorem 1 Let (x∗, y∗) be the unique pair of payoff vectors defined above. Then, in
a PNG with valuable time starting from a NFG G with a unique discounting factor
δ for both players, the strategy of player A in every subgame perfect equilibrium
consisting of stationary acceptance strategies satisfies the following (to obtain the
strategy for B simply swap x∗ and y∗):
• if A is the first player to move, then she ’proposes’ outcome x∗, i.e., makes
a conditional offer that, if accepted, would update the game into one with a
dominant strategy equilibrium yielding the Pareto maximal outcome x∗ as payoff
vector;
• when A has a pending offer y′, she accepts it if and only if the payoff she gets
in y′ is at least as much as in y∗;
• if A can pass, she passes if and only if the expected value associated to the
proposed game y′A is at least y
∗
A; otherwise she proposes x
∗.
Proof. It is easy to check, using the ODP, that no player can improve at any
history of the game by deviating from this strategy. Consider for instance the case
when player A at time t can choose whether to pass or not on the proposal of a
distribution z on which player B has already passed. If A passes then the payoff
vector will be (z, t); if not, it will be (x∗, t + 1) . Obviously (z, t)A ≥ (x∗, t + 1)A
if and only if (z, 0)A ≥ (x∗, 1)A = (y∗, 0)A, so the acceptance rule is optimal. The
reasoning for the other cases is similar.
To prove the claim we are going to use a variant of the argument provided by
Osborne and Rubinstein [1994] for bargaining games, summarised as follows. We
first show [Step 1] that the best SPE payoff for player A in any subgame G′A starting
with her proposal and where G′ is the currently accepted game — let us denote it
by MA(G
′
A) — yields the same utility as the worst one — mA(G′A) — which, in
turn, is the payoff of A at x∗. The argument for B is symmetric. Then we show
[Step 2] that in every SPE the initial proposal is x∗, which is immediately accepted
by the other player, followed by each player passing. Finally, we show [Step 3] that
the acceptance and the passing conditions given are shared by every SPE strategy
profile.
[Step 1] WLOG let A be the player moving first and call G′A each subgame of the
PNG beginning with a proposal by player A and where G′ is the currently accepted
NFG at its root (GA is the game itself). Analogously let us call G′B each subgame of
the PNG beginning with a proposal by player B. For each player i let Mi(G′i) be the
best SPE outcome that player i can get from G′i, i.e., Mi(G′i) = sup{δtxi | there
is a SPE of G′i consisting of stationary acceptance strategies with value (x, t)i}.
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Let mi(G′i) be the corresponding infimum. Recall that bi is the highest payoff that
i obtains in GX . Hereafter we write bij instead of (bi, 0)j for i, j ∈ N . By our
assumptions the observations above, bAB = b
B
A = 0.
We can now show that for each G′, MA(G′A) = mA(G′A) = x∗A and MB(G′B) =
mB(G′B) = y∗B . We first show that mB(G′B) ≥ bBB− δMA(G′A). Therefore, if player
A rejects a proposal of player B in the first period of G′B then she cannot get
more than δMA(G′A). This means that in any SPE of G′B she must accept any
proposal giving her more than δMA(G′A) (otherwise she could be at least as well
off by rejecting it). Thus what is left for player B is no less than bBB − δMA(G′A) in
any SPE of G′B .
It is easy to see that MA(G′A) ≤ bAA − δmB(G′B), because player A cannot
get more than her best agreement minus what player B could guarantee with a
rejection. That is, player A needs to pay B with the difference between her ideal
(appropriately discounted) payoff and what B could guarantee alone. We can show
now that MA(G′A) = x∗A. That MA(G′A) ≥ x∗A is easily observed from the proper-
ties satisfied by every SPE and the fact that each G′ is a transformation of G by
conditional offers. To show that MA(G′A) ≤ x∗A we argue the following. We know
that δbAB = 0. We also know that δ(b
B
B − δbAA) > 0 = bAB = bBB − bAA. In turn we have
that bAA > b
A
A − (δ(bBB − δbAA)). By the previous observations we can conclude that
MA(G′A) ≤ bAA − (δ(bBB − δMA(G′A))). But, by a similar argument to that in the
proof of Proposition 5, MA is obtained from a strongly efficient SPE. So, as the set
of maximal outcomes in GX is compact and connected, it also follows that there ex-
ists UA ∈ [MA(G′A), bAA) such that UA = bAA− (δ(bBB−δUA)). Now if MA(G′A) > x∗A
then UA 6= x∗A. Then, taking any pair of efficient agreements (a∗, b∗) such that
a∗A = UA and b
∗
A = δUA we have obtained a pair of efficient agreements contradict-
ing Property 5.2.1 (4). Similar reasoning shows that mA(G′A) = x∗A,MB(G′B) = y∗B
and finally mB(G′B) = y∗B .
[Step 2] Step 1 implies that if A is the first player to move, she starts by proposing
x∗ which is immediately accepted. Likewise for player B.
[Step 3] Step 1 and 2 imply that every SPE shares the same acceptance and
passing condition. Consider first the acceptance condition. If B rejects an offer in
G′A we go to G′B where, by what was observed before, he gets y∗B . But y∗B = δx∗B so
every proposal giving him in G′A at least x∗B should be accepted, otherwise rejected.
Putting everything together we have that player B must accept any proposal giving
him exactly x∗B . Similar reasoning applies for the passing condition and for player
A.
One important consequence of Theorem 1 is that every SPE strategy profile,
consisting of stationary acceptance strategies, of a two-player PNG with valuable
time and with N = {A,B} starting from G and with A (resp. B) first player to
move induces a play h of length 4 and of value for player A of x∗A while for player
B of δy∗B (resp. (y
∗
A, δx
∗
B) if B moves first).
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To summarise, when time is valuable and players’ value of time (impatience) is
measured by a vector of discount factors δ and no opting out allowed, the SPEs
following stationary acceptance strategies are essentially unique, efficient and redis-
tribute a maximal payoff vector in a fair way, depending on players’ impatience,
viz. in each SPE play, players agree as soon as possible and divide (almost) evenly
any of the maximal outcomes in the game. Thus, introducing value of time solves
both problems of efficiency and fairness at once.
6. Related work and comparisons
The present study has a rich pre-history and we do not purport to provide a com-
prehensive citation of all related previous work and literature here, but will only
mention various links with earlier studies and then will discuss in more detail and
compare with the most relevant recent work.
6.1. Related topics and relevant early references
Here is a selection of related topics and relevant earlier references:
. To begin with, preplay offers technically fall broadly in the scope of external-
ities. There is abundant literature on these, of which we only mention some of the
early works: Meade[1952], Maskin[1994], Varian [1994], More specifically, preplay
offers can be regarded as a special type of so called in cooperative game theory side
payments.
. In his theorem, Coase[1960] describes how efficiency of an allocation of goods
or simply an outcome can be obtained in presence of externalities, i.e. when actors’
possible decisions affect positively or negatively the payoffs of the other actors
involved. The claim, which is usually provided in a rather informal fashion, states
that if there are no transaction costs and it is possible to bargain on the effect of
the externalites, the process will lead to an efficient outcome regardless of the initial
allocation of property rights, i.e. regardless of who is endowed with the capacity of
performing the action in question.
. Rosenthal[1975] proposes one of the earliest models of preplay negotiations,
where ‘players successively commit themselves irrevocably, according to a specified
exogenous ordering, to coalitional strategies conditionally on the rest of the players
in the coalition agreeing to play their parts of the coalitional strategy’. He defines
a special solution concept, the induced outcome, and provides some sufficient con-
ditions for its existence and uniqueness.
. Several two-stage games with preplay communication have been studied in the
literature. They seem to go back to Guttman [1978] and Guttman [1987]. Kalai[1981]
studies preplay negotiation procedures as sequences of pre-defined length of “pre-
plays”, each being a joint strategy of all players. Furthermore, Matthews and Postle-
waite[1989] consider preplay communication in the context of two-person sealed-bid
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double auctions. Danziger and Schnytzer[1991] consider a 2-stage game for imple-
menting Lindahl’s voluntary-exchange mechanism. In a series of papers, incl. Far-
rel[1998], Farrell considers two-stage games, with preplay ‘cheap talk’ followed by
actual play, and discusses the role of preplay communication in ensuring Nash equi-
librium profile in the actual play. Also, Watson [1991] studies two-stage 2-person
normal form games with preplay communication and d’Aspremont and Ge´rard-
Varet[1980] study Stackelberg solvable games with preplay communication.
. Our preplay negotiation games are closely related to bargaining games, see
Rubinstein [1982], Osborne and Rubinstein [1990],
Osborne and Rubinstein [1994], and Myerson[1997].
. Another related early work is Varian [1994] where he studies variations of
‘compensatory mechanisms’ where, instead of making offers, players declare com-
pensations for which they are prepared to play one or another strategy (in favour of
another player who is willing to pay such compensation and makes a binding offer
for it). Although the flavour of such variation is somewhat different, technically it
reduces to a type of games with preplay offers that we have considered here.
. Fershtman, et al.[1991], and more recently Monderer and Tennenholtz [2009],
consider the use of ‘agents’ or ’mediators’ playing on behalf of the players, and
show how such mechanisms can be used to achieve more efficient outcomes in non-
cooperative games.
. The idea of combining competition and cooperation in non-cooperative games
has been considered often since the early times of game theory, and has later evolved
in theories of co-opetition by Brandeburger and Nalebuffs [1997] and more recently
Carf`ı and Schiliro` [2011]. Related in spirit are some theories of coalitional rationality,
see Ambrus[2009].
6.2. Detailed comparison with most relevant recent work
To our knowledge, Jackson and Wilkie have been the first to explicitly study arbi-
trary transfer functions from one to another player in a normal form game. That
work was preceded by earlier relevant literature mentioned above, such as Guttman
[1978] Danziger and Schnytzer[1991] Varian [1994] Qin[2002], where only limited
forms of payments were considered, such as payments proportional to the actions
taken by the other players or only contingent on own actions. Jackson and Wilkie’s
framework bears substantial similarities with ours, as it studies a two-stage transfor-
mations on a normal form game where players announce transfers functions which
update the initial normal form game and then play the updated game. Jackson and
Wilkie study the subgame perfect equilibria of the two stage game and show under
what conditions equilibria of the original game survive in the update game. They
focus on the 2-player case, but they also extend their results to the N-player case.
However, there are some essential conceptual and technical differences between this
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framework and our, which we describe and discuss below. In Jackson and Wilkie
[2005]:
. Transfers from a player A to a player B are of the form (in our notation)
A
δ/σ−−→ B where σ ∈ ∏i∈N Σi, δ ∈ R+ and δ = 0 whenever A = B, i.e. players are
allowed to make positive side payments to other players that are conditional on the
entire strategy profile played, and not only on the recipient’s individual strategy, as
in our framework. Technically, every unconditional offer from player A to player B
can be simulated by a set of such transfers from A to B. This is not the case for
conditional offers, which would instead require a set of transfers from B to A as
well, or the possibility for δ to be negative, i.e. the introduction of punishments. So,
these two types of offers are generally incompatible.
. Players announce their transfer functions simultaneously. This is a reasonable
choice in many situations, e.g., where players only have the possibility of once-off
exchange before the actual play, and where the sequential aspects of decisions do
not play any essential role, but it is not so in many others where they would rather
bargain on their choice of actions, which a central feature of our framework. In
this sense, the framework of Jackson and Wilkie [2005] and ours have essentially
different scopes of applicability.
. The authors study strategies that can be supported, i.e. that they are subgame
perfect equilibria of the two-stage game and Nash-equilibria of the original game
that also survive — i.e. remain equilibria — in the updated game. In particular, they
focus on the (interesting) relation between the solo-payoff, i.e. the Nash equilibrium
payoff that a player can guarantee by making offers, and the supportability of
strategies. Jackson and Wilkie show two important results for the two-player case,
the main bulk of their paper: (i) that every Nash equilibrium x of the starting game
survives if and only if it yields for every player i a utility that is higher than the one
given by i’s solo-payoff; and (ii) that a transfer function together with an outcome
are supportable if and only if they yield for every player i a utility that is higher
than the one given by i’s minimal solo-payoff, the solo-payoff obtained by making
minimal offers. It is worth noticing that the definition of minimal offer they adopt
is essentially the one we have adopted here: the minimal transfer function needed
to change the game solution.
Ellingsen and Paltseva generalize Jackson and Wilkie’s work as follows:
. Transfers from a player A to a player B are again of the form A
δ/σ−−→ B where
σ ∈ ∏i∈N Σi, but now δ ∈ R and δ = 0 whenever A = B, i.e. players are allowed
to propose both rewards and punishments contingent upon entire strategy profiles.
This boils down to players not only making offers but also proposing contracts to
the other players to sign or reject.
. The game played is composed of three stages: (i) the one in which players
propose contracts, (ii) the one in which players decide whether to sign a contract,
(iii) the one in which players play the game updated by the signed contract.
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. Contracts are proposed on mix strategies, and non-deterministic contracts are
considered, i.e. it is possible to make randomise offers.
While in Jackson and Wilkie [2005] each player A specifies the (nonnegative)
transfer of payoff to the other players for each pure strategy profile σ, in Elligsen
and Paltseva[2011] each player specifies a (possibly negative) transfer to the other
players for each (possibly mixed) strategy profile σ and, at the same time, specifies
a signing decision for each contract of the other players. Ellingsen and Paltseva
show that their more general contracting game always has efficient equilibria. In
particular they show that all the efficient outcomes guaranteeing to each player at
least as much as the worst Nash-equilibrium payoff in the original game can be
attained in some equilibrium.
Yamada [2005] considers variants of the games in Jackson and Wilkie [2005]
where one player moves before the other and the move of the second ends the
preplay phase, showing a clear advantage of the latter player in improving is own
payoff. In particular, Yamada shows that:
• the second player can always increase his original payoff, i.e. the payoff he gets
in the starting game, in every surviving Nash equilibrium
• every surviving Nash equilibrium that is also maximally Pareto optimal gives
the second player at least his original payoff
Clearly Yamada’s framework is a step closer to ours than Jackson and Wilkie’s.
However the games analysed there are a rather restricted sort of Stackelberg games,
where the second player behaves like a dictator: not only can he best respond to
the first player, but he can unilaterally decide that the game will end with him
improving his original payoff.
All in all, the message conveyed by this stream of contributions is that efficiency
can be reached if the structure of players’ offers is complex enough. On the one
hand Jackson and Wilkie show that promises are not enough to attain efficient
outcomes, while Ellingsen and Paltseva show that contracting is. Possibly only
Yamada’s framework acknowledges that the structure of the game might influence
the preplay phase. Our results lie on a rather different axis, as we restrict the type
of offers to ones that only commit the proposer, not the recipient, and focus on the
effects that additional factors in the preplay negotiation game, e.g. value of time
and conditional offers, have on attaining outcomes with desirable properties, such
as efficiency and fairness. We also discuss how equilibrium strategies themselves
display desirable properties, i.e. being efficient negotiation strategies.
7. Further agenda and concluding remarks
The main purpose of the present paper is to initiate a systematic study of pre-
play negotiations in non-cooperative games, and to outline a broad and long-term
research agenda for that study. We have indicated a number of conceptual and tech-
nical problems and have only sketched some results, but still much work needs to
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be done. In particular, we identify two natural and important directions of current
and future extensions of our framework:
Coalitional offers. The analysis of N -player normal form games with preplay
negotiations phase, for N > 2, is much more complicated than the 2-players case.
To begin with, the benefit for a player A of player B playing a strategy induced by
an offer from A to B crucially depend on the strategies that the remaining players
choose to play, so an offer from a player to another player does not have the clear
effect that it has in the 2-player case. Thus, a player may have to make a collec-
tive offer to several (possibly all) other players in order to orchestrate their plays
in the best possible for him way. Furthermore, a player may be able to benefit in
different ways by making offers for side payments to different players or groups of
players, and the accumulated benefit from these different offers may or may not be
worth the total price paid for it. Lastly, when all players make their offers pursuing
their individual interests only, the total effect may be completely unpredictable, or
even detrimental for all players. It is therefore natural that groups of players get
to collaborate in coordinating their offers. Thus, a coalitional behaviour naturally
emerges here, and the preplay negotiation phase incorporates playing a coalitional
game to determine the partition of all players into coalitions that will coordinate
their offers in the negotiation phase. However, we emphasise again that the trans-
formed normal form game played after the preplay negotiation phase should remain
a non-cooperative game where every player eventually plays for himself.
Inter-play offers in extensive form games. The problem of underperfor-
mance is not limited to normal form games, where players cannot observe the out-
come of the opponents’ actions during the play. It also arises in some extensive
form games, such as the Centipede game, where the Backward Induction strategy
profile can prescribe to players an utterly inefficient solution. The idea of preplay
offers of payments to other players can be applied quite effectively in extensive
form games by means of inter-play offers, where, before every move of a player,
the other player(s) can make him individual or coalitional offers conditional on his
forthcoming move. The players from both sides can consider these offers through
some commonly accepted solution concept, e.g. Backward Induction, which would
provide current values for each player of every subgame arising after the possible
moves of A.
In conclusion, the focal problems of the study initiated here are to:
• analyse the game-theoretic effects of preplay/interplay offers for payments be-
tween individual players and coalitions in strategic and extensive form games,
with complete and incomplete information;
• develop the theory of preplay negotiations and, in particular, the concept of
efficient negotiations under various assumptions considered here;
• analyse the optimality and efficiency of the solutions that can be achieved in
preplay negotiation games;
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• expand the study into a systematic theory of cooperation through negotiations
in non-cooperative games.
• apply the developed theory and the obtained results both descriptively and
prescriptively to real-life scenarios where our framework applies.
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